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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mark Lee Ellis, timely appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction and 
argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Mr. Ellis 
asserts that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, protected by 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 
I§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution, was violated when law enforcement officers entered his 
apartment and conducted a search without a warrant and without any valid exceptions 
to the warrant requirement. 1 Specifically, he asserts that he has standing to challenge 
the State's warrantless entry into his apartment based on trespass theory, as recently 
clarified in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), as opposed to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy theory. Mr. Ellis also argues that the State failed to prove the 
existence of a parole agreement which it relied on to circumvent the warrant 
requirement. 
In the event it is determined that the State met its burden by establishing that 
Mr. Ellis waived his right to be free from warrantless searches, he argues that under 
l.C. § 20-228 the parole agreement and the waiver contained therein were suspended 
at the time the State entered his residence. Mr. Ellis also argues that neither the third 
party consent, nor exigency, exceptions to the warrant requirement are applicable under 
the facts of this case. 
1 For the remainder of this brief, Mr. Ellis will address his State and Federal rights as his 
Fourth Amendment rights, but he is not abandoning his State constitutional challenge to 
the search of his apartment. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Ellis was on parole in an unrelated matter, and on March 17, 2010, he was 
arrested by his parole officer, Officer Kiehl, pursuant to an agent's warrant. 2 (R., pp.53-
56, 58, 68-69, 193.) On March 19, 2010, while still incarcerated, Mr. Ellis contacted a 
neighbor and asked her to go into his apartment and remove a methamphetamine pipe, 
some drugs, some DVDs, and some cells phones. (R., pp.67, 74-75, 193.) Mr. Ellis 
also told the neighbor that the items were located in a secret compartment or room, 
which could only be accessed with either a knife or a screwdriver. (R., pp.75, 193.) 
Instead of removing the items, the neighbor called Officer Kiehl and left a 
message. (R., p.67.) Officer Kiehl, contacted the neighbor on Monday March 29, 2010, 
at 4 pm, and she told officer Kiehl about Mr. Ellis' items and the secret room where they 
were stored. (R., p.67.) That same day, Officer Kiehl contacted Mr. Ellis' landlord Joe 
Guerricabeitia, and left a message. (R., p.67.) Officer Kiehl eventually contacted 
Mr. Guerricabeitia that same day, and they agreed to meet the following Tuesday, 
l\t1arch 30, 2010, to "search [Mr.] Ellis' apartment.3 (R., p.67.) The following day Officer 
Kiehl contacted Mr. Guerricabeitia at 11 :34 am to confirm their meeting. (R., p.67.) 
Officer Kiehl then contacted Ada County Dispatch, at 11 :48 am and requested a police 
officer to assist him in the search of Mr. Ellis' apartment. (R., p.67.) 
Officer Kiehl met Mr. Guerricabeitia at 12:10 pm, in the parking lot of Mr. Ellis' 
apartment. (R., p.67.) Officer Kiehl explained to Mr. Guerricabeitia the secret room 
described by Mr. Ellis' neighbor. (R., p.67.) Mr. Guerricabeitia "explained that the 
2 The degree of specificity used in the Statement of Facts is relevant to the analysis of 
the issues contained in Section l(C)(5), infra. 
3 Neither March 29, 2010 nor March 30, 2010, correlated with the date of a major 
holiday. 
2 
'secret room' was a maintenance area on the porch outside the defendant's apartment 
which only the landlord and his maintenance worker were supposed to use and access." 
(R., p.194.) Mr. Guerricabeitia also noted that the room had an exterior entrance from 
the porch and an interior entrance in Mr. Ellis' apartment. (R., p.67.) 
Mr. Guerricabeitia then opened the exterior door on the porch. (R., pp.67, 194.) 
However, "[t]he area was closed." (R., p.194.) Mr. Guerricabeitia "then closed and 
locked the door and" they "went back to their vehicles." (R., p.67.) 
Mr. Guerricabeitia then "retrieved several screwdrivers from his vehicle . " 
(R., p.67.) At 12:35 pm, a police officer, Officer Nickerson, arrived. (R., p.68.) Officer 
Kiehl, Officer Nickerson, and Mr. Guerricabeitia entered Mr. Ellis' apartment. (R., p.68.) 
Officer Kiehl noted that the "contents of the apartment appeared to be exactly the same 
as when [he] arrested [Mr. Ellis] on ... March 17, 201 O." (R., p.68.) 
Mr. Guerricabeitia "then used a screwdriver to open a door without a door handle 
on the south side of [Mr. Ellis'] residence that matched the description provided by 
[Mr. Ellis'] neighbor. (R., p.68.) After the door was opened, Officer Kiehl noted that it 
was the entrance to the same room which was previously accessed from the porch. 
(R., p.68.) Officer Kiehl then discovered, among other things, drug paraphernalia, 
controlled substances, cell phones, and some DVDs. (R., p.194.) 
On April 5, 2010, Officer Kiehl "searched one (1) DVD and noticed several file 
names consistent with child pornography." (R., p.68.) A detective then reviewed two 
videos on the DVD and found child pornography. (R., pp.75-76.) Officer Kiehl obtained 
a search warrant to conduct a subsequent search of the DVDs. (R., pp.71-81.) 
Mr. Ellis was charged, by Information, with ten counts of possession of sexually 
explicit material and a sentencing enhancement for a prior conviction for a registerable 
3 
sex offense. (R., pp.152-155, 165-166.) Mr. Ellis filed a suppression motion requesting 
that all of the evidence which was obtained during the search of his residence be 
suppressed. 4 (R., pp.31-35.) In support of his motion, Mr. Ellis also provided exhibits 
including, a report of probation violation, the parole violation findings, an IDOC parole 
supplemental report, a Boise police department supplemental report, and the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant. 5 (R., pp.50-77.) The State also filed an objection and a 
supplemental objection to the motion to suppress both with supporting memoranda. 
(R., pp.85-90, 146-150.) Thereafter, the district court denied Mr. Ellis' suppression 
motion, and noted that both the State and Mr. Ellis only relied on Mr. Ellis' exhibits. 
(R., p.193 n.1.) 
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Ellis pleaded guilty to two counts 
of possession of sexually exploitive material and preserved his ability to challenge the 
denial of his suppression motion on appeal. (R., p.204; Tr., p.12, L.24 - p.13, L.9.) In 
return, the State dismissed the remaining counts and the sentence enhancement. 
(R., p.204; Tr., p.11, Ls.10-17.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence 
of ten years, with five years fixed for count one and a consecutive sentence of five years 
fixed for count two. (R., pp.218-220.) Mr. Ellis timely appealed. (R., pp.225-229.) 
Mr. Ellis then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion 
requesting leniency, which was denied by the district court. 6 (R., pp.245-248, 253-254.) 
4 Mr. Ellis filed two amended motions to suppress. (R., pp.41-45, 104-108.) 
5 Mr. Ellis also provided a notice of filing supplemental authority, which included State v. 
Fuller, 138 Idaho 60 (2002). (R., pp.111-113.) 
6 Mr. Ellis is not challenging the denial of his Rule 35 motion on appeal. 
4 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ellis' motion to suppress? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ellis' Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ellis argues that the State violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures when it entered his apartment without a 
search warrant. In support of this position, l\/lr. Ellis argues that he has standing to 
challenge the search of his apartment in reliance on United States v. Jones, which 
clarified that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), did not abandon prior United 
States Supreme Court precedents holding that the Fourth Amendment protects against 
governmental intrusions on private property when that intrusion is for the purpose of 
obtaining information. Even though Mr. Ellis did not establish an objective privacy 
interest in the storage area, he argues that he has standing to challenge the State's 
entrance into his apartment and its subsequent discovery of contraband based on a 
trespass theory. 
Mr. Ellis also argues that the State failed to establish the extent to which he 
waived his Fourth Amendment rights in his parole agreement because the State failed 
to enter the parole agreement into the trial court's record. In the event that this Court 
finds that Mr. Ellis waived his Fourth Amendment rights in the parole agreement, he 
argues that the waiver was not applicable at the time of the search because l.C. § 20-
228 states that the issuance of his arrest warrant for his parole violation suspended his 
parole and his parole agreement because the warrant changed his legal status from a 
parolee to a fugitive from justice. 
Mr. Ellis also argues that neither the third party consent nor exigency exceptions 
to the warrant requirement are applicable under the facts of this matter. 
6 
B. Standard Of Review 
In State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals 
articulated the following standard of review for an appeal from a motion to suppress: 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely 
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. At a 
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court. 
Id. at 302 (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ellis' Motion To Suppress 
1. In Light Of The Holding In United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 
(2012), Mr. Ellis Has Standing To Challenge The Search Of The 
Storage Area 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I § 17. The "physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed .... " State v. 
Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 523 (1986) (quoting United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)) (emphasis in original). Mr. Ellis has a similar liberty 
interest under Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. See State v. Christensen, 131 
Idaho 143, 146 (1998) ("Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of Art. I, § 17 is to 
protect Idaho citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy against arbitrary governmental 
intrusion."). "Whether a search is reasonable 'is determined by assessing, on the one 
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."' 
7 
Samson v. California 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 
U.S. 112, 118 (2001)). 
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. State v. Martinez, 129 
Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996). "The Fourth Amendment's protection is a personal 
right which may be enforced by the exclusion of illegally acquired evidence only at the 
behest of one whose rights were infringed by an improper government intrusion." 
State v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 131 (Ct. App. 1996). 
In this case, the district court employed the following analysis to determine that 
Mr. Ellis did not have standing7 to challenge the search: 
[T]he motion to suppress concerns an area which was actually a 
maintenance storage area which was only supposed to be available to the 
landlord and the maintenance staff. Even if the defendant had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the storage area, it is hardly 
reasonable for a defendant to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
an area which he is not authorized to use and which is for the use of the 
landlord and the maintenance staff. 
(R., p.195.) The district court's conclusion was based on Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 351 (1967), where the United States Supreme Court held that "the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places." (R., p.195.) 
Mr. Ellis argues that standing can be established even though he had no privacy 
expectation in the area searched. For this argument, Mr. Ellis relies on United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), which clarified the holding in Katz. In Jones, law 
7 The term "standing" is no longer a technically accurate way to describe the relevant 
inquiry in this case as the United States Supreme Court has rejected the concept of 
"standing" insofar as that concept implicates only procedural rules: "[l]n determining 
whether a defendant is able to show the violation of his . . . Fourth Amendment rights, 
the 'definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive 
Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing."' Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 
88 (1998) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1978)). Nevertheless, since 
the courts continue to use the term "standing" imprecisely, that term is also used 
imprecisely by Mr. Ellis to describe the relevant inquiry in this case. 
8 
enforcement suspected Antoine Jones was involved in drug trafficking. Id. at 948. The 
government gathered information about Mr. Jones' activities and applied for a search 
warrant authorizing "the use of an electronic trafficking device" on a vehicle registered to 
Mr. Jones' wife. Id. The warrant was issued but required that the trafficking device be 
attached in the District of Columbia and within ten days. Id. Eleven days later, the 
government attached a Global-Positioning-System (hereinafter, GPS) tracking device to 
the undercarriage of Ms. Jones' vehicle while it was parked in a public parking lot in the 
State of Maryland. Id. For the next four weeks a significant amount of data was 
obtained from the GPS device, and Mr. Jones was ultimately indicted on federal 
charges related to drug trafficking. Id. 
Mr. Jones filed a suppression motion; the government conceded its 
noncompliance with the warrant, but argued that a warrant was not required. Id. at 948 
n.1. The district court partially granted the motion precluding the government from 
introducing any evidence obtained by the use of the GPS device during periods of time 
while Ms. Jones' vehicle was parked in a garage adjoining the Jones' residence. Id. at 
948. However, the district court held that "the remaining data was admissible, because 
'[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another." Id. (quoting United 
States v. Jones, 451 F.Supp.2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006). 
The United States Supreme Court eventually granted certiorari. The central 
issue before the Court question was "whether the attachment of a [GPS] tracking device 
to an individual's vehicle, and the subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's 
movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment." Id. The Jones opinion began its discussion by further clarifying 
9 
that the issue at hand involved the government's physical occupation of "private 
property for the purpose of obtaining information." Id. at 949. The Court went on to 
state that this "physical intrusion would have been considered a 'search' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted because at that time and for 
the first half of the 20th century the Court's "Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied 
to common-law trespass." Id. However, the Katz Court "deviated from that exclusive 
property-based approach" when it said that "the Fourth Amendment protects people not 
places .... " Id. at 950 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
After setting forth the foregoing framework, the Court then addressed the 
Government's argument. Specifically, the government argued that Mr. Jones "had no 
'reasonable expectation of privacy' in the area of [Ms. Jones' vehicle] accessed by 
Government agents (its underbody) and in the locations of the [vehicle] on the public 
roads, which were visible to all." Id. The Court then employed the following analysis in 
rejecting this argument: 
[W]e need not address the Government's contentions, because Jones's 
Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At 
bottom, we must "assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against 
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted."8 As 
explained, for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood 
to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas 
("persons, houses, papers, and effects") it enumerates. Katz did not 
repudiate that understanding. Less than two years later the Court upheld 
defendants' contention that the Government could not introduce against 
them conversations between other people obtained by warrantless 
placement of electronic surveillance devices in their homes. The opinion 
rejected the dissent's contention that there was no Fourth Amendment 
violation "unless the conversational privacy of the homeowner himself is 
invaded."9 "[W]e [do not] believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth 
Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was 
intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends 
to the home .... " Id., at 180, 89 S. Ct. 961. 
8 Quoting Ky/lo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001 ). 
9 Quot;ng Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969). 
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Id. at 950-951 (footnotes omitted) (original emphasis). The Court went on to state that 
"the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, 
the common-law trespass test." Id. at 952 (emphasis in original). In other words, a 
reasonable expectation of privacy need not be established in instances where the State 
trespasses on a constitutionally protected area, i.e., a person's house, papers, or effects 
as a means to obtain information. The Court held that "[b)y attaching the device to the 
[vehicle], officers encroached on a protected area." Id. 
There is a significant similarity between the search in this matter and the search 
in Jones. In Jones it was not argued that Mr. Jones had a privacy interest in the 
underbody of his vehicle, "which was visible to all." Id. at 950. Similarly, Mr. Ellis is not 
asserting that he has a privacy interest in the storage area, which was where the 
contraband was discovered. That similarity is important because the Supreme Court 
implicitly noted in Jones that the government had other legal means to obtain the 
evidence it ultimately suppressed, and that the Fourth Amendment violation occurred 
when the government made the decision to encroach on the underbody of Ms. Jones' 
vehicle, which is a constitutionally protected area. Id. at 951-953. This case is very 
similar in that Officer Kiehl made the decision to access the storage area through 
Mr. Ellis' apartment, which is also a constitutionally protected area. (R., pp.67-68.) 
In light of the foregoing, the district court's conclusion that Mr. Ellis did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the storage area is irrelevant because Mr. Ellis has 
standing to challenge the search of his apartment based on the trespass theory clarified 
in Jones. 10 The district court's analysis would be correct had the State accessed the 
10 Mr. Ellis recognizes that the Jones opinion was published after the district court 
denied his suppression motion. However, the United State's Supreme Court stated that 
11 
items solely through the porch entrance. However, for some reason not entirely clear 
on the record, Officer Kiehl decided to access the storage area from a door inside 
Mr. Ellis' residence, which constitutes a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. (R., pp.67-68, 193-194.) 
In sum, Mr. Ellis need not prove he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the storage area in order to establish standing because Officer Kiehl's decision to 
trespass into Mr. Ellis' apartment created the standing necessary for Mr. Ellis to 
challenge the legality of the search of his apartment on the basis of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
2. The State Failed To Meet Its Burden Of Proving The Existence Of The 
Parole Agreement It Relied On As An Exception To The Warrant 
Requirement 
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. State v. Martinez, 129 
Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996). However, warrants are not required if a search falls 
under "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (quoting Katz U.S. at 357); see also State v. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218 (1999). The State "bears the burden to demonstrate that a 
warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." Martinez, 129 
Idaho at 431 (citation omitted). If the government fails to meet this burden, the evidence 
acquired as a result of the illegal search, including later-discovered evidence derived 
from the original illegal search, is inadmissible in court. Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219; See 
Katz never abandoned the prior trespass theory and, therefore, Jones is applicable to 
all cases pending on direct appellate review. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 952. 
12 
a/so Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
In this case, the State argued, and the district court found, that Mr. Ellis was on 
parole at the time of the search and that he had "given a waiver of his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from [searches] as a condition of being granted parole." 
(R., pp.149, 196-200.) Mr. Ellis recognizes that all parties were operating under the 
assumption that he had waived his Fourth Amendment rights as part of his parole 
agreement; however, the State failed to put the parole agreement in the record. 11 
The only evidence the State relied on were the documents provided by Mr. Ellis 
in support of his suppression motion. In support of Mr. Ellis' motion, trial counsel 
submitted exhibits including, a report of probation violation, the parole violation findings, 
an I DOC parole supplemental report, a Boise Police Department supplemental report, 
and the affidavit in support of the search warrant. (R., pp.50-77.) The district court 
noted in its memorandum decision denying Mr. Ellis' motion to suppress that "[b]oth 
sides have relied on the defendant's Exhibits in Support of Amended Motion to 
Suppress Evidence .... " (R., p.193 n.1.) A hearing was held on the suppression 
motion, but no testimony was elicited by either party. (Tr., p.6 L.1 - p.9, L.13.) Thus, 
the foregoing documents are the only evidence in the record from which factual findings 
regarding the suppression motion can be based. 
11 While defense counsel operated under the assumption that the waiver existed, at no 
point did either counsel or Mr. Ellis stipulate to the waiver's existence. Therefore, 
Mr. Ellis should be able to challenge its existence on appeal. See State v. Hanson, 142 
Idaho 711, 717-718 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the State can challenge a defendant's 
standing for the first time on appeal even though all parties assumed the defendant had 
standing before the trial court.) In the event this position is rejected it will create a 
unique due process violation. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (holding 
that in criminal prosecutions, one-sided procedural laws that benefit the government 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause). 
13 
The State had various opportunities to place the parole agreement into the 
record but failed to do so. For example, the State filed two objections supported by 
memoranda, but did not submit the parole agreement in a supporting affidavit. 
(R., pp.85-90, 146-150.) As stated above, the district court held a hearing on the motion 
to suppress, but the State rested on its briefing instead of eliciting testimony about the 
contents of the parole agreement. (Tr., p.6, L.4 - p.9, L.11.) Since the parole 
agreement is not in the record, the State failed to meet its burden of proving an 
exception to the warrant requirement was applicable to the search of Mr. Ellis' 
apartment. 
Additionally, since the parole agreement is not in the record, the district court's 
factual finding that Mr. Ellis waived his Fourth Amendment rights as part of the parole 
agreement is not supported by substantial and competent evidence and is, therefore, 
clearly erroneous. See State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128 (2010) ("When we review 
an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's factual 
findings, unless they are clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if 
they are supported by substantial and competent evidence.") (citations omitted). 
There are two parts of the record which provide some factual support for the existence 
of the waiver. For example, when Officer Kiehl met Mr. Guerricabeitia, Officer Kiehl 
stated that he was there to "perform a Fourth Amendment Waiver search on [Mr. Ellis'] 
apartment." (R., p.67.) Detective Brady wrote in his affidavit that "Officer Kiehl 
explained that [Mr. Ellis] was currently on parole, and has a [Fourth] Amendment waiver 
on his residence." (R., p.139.) However, Mr. Ellis submits that this is not substantial 
evidence to support the district court's factual findings. Neither of the statements refer 
to the Fourth Amendment waiver being part of the parole agreement and neither Officer 
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Kiehl nor Detective Brady actually stated that they had personal knowledge of the 
existence of the parole agreement. See Welter v. State, 146 Idaho 652, 655 (Ct. App. 
2008) ("[AJn appellate court is not the place for factual assertions; factual assertions 
must be made and supported with admissible evidence before the trial court.") 
Another serious evidentiary problem is that the statements do not define the 
scope of the waiver. For example, the waiver could be limited to a time of day. It could 
limit areas of the residence which can be searched. It could limit which personnel are 
allowed to conduct the search. It could also control the events which trigger the 
termination of the agreement, such as an arrest for based on a parole violation. 
Without the parole agreement, there is no way of knowing whether Officer Kiehl's 
actions comported with the terms of the parole agreement. 
In sum, the State failed to meet its burden of proving an exception to the warrant 
requirement because it failed to establish the parameters of Mr. Ellis' parole agreement. 
And for that reason, the district court's factual finding that Mr. Ellis waived his Fourth 
Amendment rights was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
3. The Fourth Amendment Waiver In Mr. Ellis' Parole Agreement Was 
Not Enforceable When The State Entered His Apartment 
In the event this Court determines that the State met its burden of proving the 
existence of the waiver, Mr. Ellis argues that the waiver was not applicable because his 
parole agreement was suspended due to the fact that he had been previously arrested 
for a parole violation and was in custody at the time of the search. In support of this 
argument, Mr. Ellis relies on l.C. § 20-228, which follows: 
The commission for pardons and parole, in releasing a person on parole, 
shall specify in writing the conditions of parole, and a copy of such 
conditions shall be given to the person paroled. Whenever the commission 
finds that a parolee may have violated the conditions of parole, the written 
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order of the comm1ss1on, signed by a member or members of the 
commission or the executive director, shall be sufficient warrant for any 
law enforcement officer to take into custody such person, and it is hereby 
made the duty of all sheriffs, police, constables, parole and probation 
officers, prison officials and other peace officers, to execute such order. 
Such warrant shall serve to suspend the person's parole until a 
determination on the merits of the allegations of the violation has been 
made pursuant to a revocation hearing. From and after the issuance of the 
warrant and suspension of the parole of any convicted person and until 
arrest, the parolee shall be considered a fugitive from justice. Such person 
so recommitted must serve out the sentence, and the time during which 
such prisoner was out on parole shall not be deemed a part thereof; 
unless the commission, in its discretion, shall determine otherwise, but 
nothing herein contained shall prevent the commission from again paroling 
such prisoners at its discretion. 
(emphasis added). When interpreting a statute, courts are to adhere to the literal 
language of the statute unless there is an ambiguity. City of Sandpoint v. Highway 
Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69 (2003). In order to be deemed ambiguous, a statute must be 
deemed to have more than one reasonable construction. Id. No ambiguity exists even 
if the plain language of a statute creates a palpably absurd result. Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 894-896 (2011 ). When dealing 
with an unambiguous statute, Idaho courts cannot engage in statutory construction, or 
in, other words, modify or void a statute, because the power to do so is legislative not 
judicial. Id. 
Idaho Code Section 20-228 is not ambiguous and there is only one reasonable 
interpretation of l.C. § 20-228 which is consistent with the plain language of the statute. 
That interpretation is also consistent with Mr. Ellis' position. Specially, the third 
sentence of the statute states that a "warrant shall serve to suspend the person's parole 
until a determination on the merits of the allegations of the violation has been made 
pursuant to a revocation hearing." l.C. § 20-228 (emphasis added). That sentence 
indicates that parole is suspended when the arrest warrant is issued and until the parole 
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revocation hearing is held. The fourth sentence states "[f]rom and after the issuance of 
the warrant and suspension of the parole of any convicted person and until arrest, the 
parolee shall be considered a fugitive from justice." l.C. § 20-228 (emphasis added). 
That sentence reaffirms the third sentence by stating that issuance of the arrest warrant 
suspends parole and the parolee loses the status as a parolee and becomes a "fugitive 
from justice" until s/he is arrested. l.C. § 20-228. In other words, once the warrant is 
issued, the parolee's legal status changes and s/he becomes a fugitive from justice. 
The fifth sentence states that "[s}uch person so recommitted must serve out the 
sentence ... but nothing herein contained shall prevent the commission from again 
paroling such prisoners at its discretion." l.C. § 20-228 (emphasis added). This 
sentence states that the fugitive from justice is recommitted and must serve out the 
reminder of the sentence unless the commission decides to place the person back on 
parole. In other words, that sentence states that after the issuance of the warrant the 
parolee is no longer on parole and is no longer a parolee and it is at the actual 
revocation hearing the commission decides whether to reinstate parole. Since parole is 
technically revoked it logically follows that the parole agreement is either suspended or 
terminated and, therefore, unenforceable. Another way to think about it is through 
contract law. Once Mr. Ellis lost the benefit of the parole agreement, release from 
custody, the State can no longer enforce the agreement. 
Further support for Mr. Ellis' position can be found in State v. Fuller, 138 Idaho 
60 (2002). In that case, Mr. Fuller was convicted for a felony and released on parole. 12 
Id. at 61. Mr. Fuller's parole agreement included a waiver of his Fourth Amendment 
rights. Id. Mr. Fuller's parole officer submitted a report alleging the Mr. Fuller had 
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violated the terms of his parole and an order was issued which stated that "[t]he Board 
of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision hereby suspends the supervision of the above 
named person .... You are hereby authorized and directed to take custody and have 
this person detained .... " Id. 
Mr. Fuller then went to his parole officer's office for a regularly scheduled 
appointment. Id. During that appointment, Mr. Fuller provided a urine sample which 
tested positive for methamphetamine. Id. Mr. Fuller was handcuffed and subsequently 
told his parole officer that he had methamphetamine in his car. Id. at 62. Mr. Fuller's 
car was searched and methamphetamine was discovered. Id. New charges were then 
brought against Mr. Fuller. Id. 
Mr. Fuller filed a suppression motion and argued that his oral statements to his 
parole officer should be suppressed. Id. The district court granted the motion and, in 
doing so, reasoned that under l.C. § 20-228 the "issuance of the arrest warrant 
suspended [Mr. Fuller's] parole ... and that the Idaho probation and parole officers 
therefore no longer had authority to ask him to submit to urinalysis." Id. The State 
appealed and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. Id. at 62-63. 
However, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court based on the following 
analysis: 
The provisions of the parole supervision agreement continued in force as 
long as Fuller was under the Department's supervision. The Department's 
duty to supervise [Mr. Fuller] was governed by Idaho Code § 20-219,13 
12 Mr. Fuller was convicted in Oregon and moved to Idaho. Id. at 61. However, that 
factual nuance does not alter the relevant legal analysis. 
13 The relevant language of l.C. § 20-219 follows: 
The state board of correction shall be charged with the duty of supervising 
all persons convicted of a felony placed on probation or released from the 
state penitentiary on parole, and all persons convicted of a felony released 
on parole or probation from other states and residing in the state of Idaho; 
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which provides, "The state board of correction shall be charged with the 
duty of supervising ... all persons convicted of a felony released on 
parole or probation from other states and residing in the state of Idaho." A 
parolee is "released" when he is allowed to be out of confinement. As 
long as Fuller was released, the Department had the duty of supervising 
him, and the parole supervision agreement he signed was still in effect. 
Even though on February 22, 1999, the Oregon authorities suspended 
Fuller's parole and he was legally a fugitive from justice, he was still 
released. He was not yet in custody. The order suspending Fuller's parole 
only authorized the authorities to take him into custody pursuant to the 
authority of the Oregon order. He remained released, however, until he 
was actually taken into custody under the authority of that order. Thus, 
when Fuller arrived at the probation and parole office on February 24, 
1999, he was still under the Department's supervision, and, pursuant to 
the parole supervision agreement, the Idaho probation and parole officers 
had authority to demand that Fuller produce a urine sample for analysis 
and to search his vehicle. 
Id. at 63 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In other words, the question of whether 
a parolee's parole agreement is in force turns on whether the parolee is in custody. If 
an arrest warrant has been issued for a parole violation that alone does not suspend the 
terms of parole agreement. However, after a parolee has been arrested and taken into 
custody the parole agreement is no longer enforceable. Unlike Mr. Fuller, Mr. Ellis had 
been arrested and was in custody for a parole violation at the time Officer Kiehl 
searched his apartment and, therefore, his parole agreement was not enforceable 
during that time. (R., pp.58, 193, 200.) 
Despite the holding in Fuller, the district court concluded that Fuller was not 
controlling and it relied on federal case law because Fuller "did not reach the question of 
whether the parolee's prior consent to search was a condition of his parole is revoked 
of making such investigations as may be necessary; of reporting alleged 
violations of parole or probation in specific cases to the commission or the 
courts to aid in determining whether the parole or probation should be 
continued or revoked and of preparing a case history record of the 
prisoners to assist the commission or the courts in determining if they 
should be paroled or should be released on probation. 
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by l.C. 20-228." (R., p.199.) The district court further reasoned a parolee's parole 
agreement was enforceable until parole is revoked after a formal parole revocation 
hearing. (R., pp.196-200.) Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the Idaho 
Supreme Court's reasoning in Fuller controls because it holds that the parole 
agreement was enforceable until Mr. Fuller was taken into custody. Id. at 63. The 
logical extension of that rationale is that the parole agreement was no longer 
enforceable after Mr. Fuller was taken into custody because he was no longer under the 
supervision of the parole board and, therefore, his parole agreement was suspended 
pursuant to l.C. § 20-228. Had the Fuller Court intended to determine that parole was 
not suspended until parole is formally revoked, it would have so stated in its opinion. 
However, out of apparent deference to l.C. § 20-228 and the Idaho Legislature, the 
Court concluded differently, as such a conclusion would be contrary to the unambiguous 
language of l.C. § 20-228. 
Additionally, the district court's decision to reject Fuller and rely on federal case 
law was in error because the federal cases relied upon are readily distinguishable due 
to the fact there appears to be no federal analog to l.C. § 20-288. The main opinion 
utilized by the district court is United States v. Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2005). 
The district court's analysis of that case follows: 
Federal appellate authority is unanimous in holding that suspension of 
parole does not immediately suspend the Fourth Amendment waiver in the 
parole agreement. United States v. Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 
2005). As the court in Trujillo points out, the parole agreement remains in 
effect, in some sense, even while suspended: it is only on the basis of the 
parole agreement that a warrant based on a parole violation could be 
issued. Id. at 1244. Only after the parolee's parole has elapsed or been 
revoked do the former parolee's Fourth Amendment rights change. 
(R., p.199 (emphasis added).) 
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The district court's analysis of Trujillo is flawed for several reasons. The first and 
most important is the fact that the Trujillo opinion does not analyze a statute analogous 
to l.C. § 20-288. Due to that distinction, the district court's analysis is misleading 
because it assumes that there is such a federal statute or other federal rule analyzed in 
Trujillo. For example, the district court stated that "[f]ederal appellate authority is 
unanimous in holding that suspension of parole does not immediately suspend the 
Fourth Amendment Waiver in the agreement." (R., p.199 (emphasis added).) The 
district court went on to state that "Trujillo points out, the parole agreement remains in 
effect, in some sense, even while suspended .... " (R., p.199 (emphasis added).) 
The Trujillo opinion never held that parole is suspended in the federal system 
upon the arrest of a federal parolee for a parole violation. In Trujillo, Mr. Trujillo 
provided two reasons why his arrest suspended the parole agreement The first reason 
was "that the purposes of the parole agreement were no longer relevant once he was 
taken into custody." Trujillo, 404 3d at 1243. While rejecting that argument, the Tenth 
Circuit analyzed that policies behind parole and the parole agreement, but it never 
stated that parole is suspended when the parolee is arrested in the federal system. And 
it never discussed how a suspension of parole would affect the question of whether a 
parole agreement is enforceable in the event a federal parolee is arrested. 
Mr. Trujillo's second argument was "that the parole agreement was intended to 
place conditions on his liberty only so long as he remained free on parole. Once police 
took him into custody, the argument continues he lost the liberty of parole and the 
agreement ceased to operate." Id. at 1244. Again, Mr. Trujillo never argued that there 
was a federal statute which caused his parole to be suspended upon his arrest. 
Mr. Trujillo argued, based on a contract theory, that his parole agreement terminated 
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upon his arrest. The Tenth Circuit employed the following analysis in rejecting this 
argument: 
While this may be Mr. Trujillo's understanding of the agreement, there is 
nothing in the text of agreement14 to suggest that it terminates at the 
moment a law enforcement officer takes Mr. Trujillo into custody. At trial, 
Agent Hudspeth testified that Mr. Trujillo technically remained on parole 
after his arrest because the adjudication of his parole violations was 
deferred until the resolution of his federal case. Mr. Trujillo complains that 
if this is the case, authorities could search his residence many months 
after his incarceration. This assertion may or may not be correct, but it has 
no bearing on our analysis. To resolve this appeal we need determine only 
whether the parole agreement remained in effect minutes after 
Mr. Trujillo's arrest. There is nothing in the parole agreement to suggest 
that it did not, and, accordingly, we hold that Mr. Trujillo's arrest did not 
affect the validity of the parole agreement. 
Id. Again, the Tenth Circuit did not analyze or discuss the effect of a federal statute 
which suspends parole upon the arrest of a federal parolee. As such, the district court's 
reliance on Trujillo is misplaced because it does not address the questions before tl·1is 
Court and the Idaho Supreme Court in Fuller, to wit, whether l.C. § 20-288 and its 
suspension language affects the enforceability of a parole agreement after a parolee is 
arrested. Since that was not the issue in Trujillo, the district court's assumption that an 
arrest in the federal system suspends a parolee's parole is misleading. 
Another point can be drawn from the foregoing block quote. In this case, the 
district court stated, in its paragraph discussing Trujillo, that "[o]nly after the parolee's 
parole has elapsed or been revoked do the former parolee's Fourth Amendment rights 
change." (R., p.199.) Since there was no citation after that sentence it is unclear if that 
14 As noted in Section l(C)(2), supra, the State failed to meet its burden to prove the 
existence of a Fourth Amendment waiver regarding Mr. Ellis' parole agreement because 
it failed to put that agreement into the record. Due to that failure, this Court has no way 
of knowing if the question at issue, whether Mr. Ellis' arrest terminated his parole 
agreement, is controlled by the text of the agreement. Based on that failure alone, the 
district court's order denying Mr. Ellis' suppression motion should be reversed. 
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is the district court's own conclusion or if the district court was asserting that the Trujillo 
opinion stands for that proposition. Regardless of that question, the Trujillo opinion 
expressly stated that it would not decide that question because the only issue before the 
Court was "whether the parole agreement remained in effect minutes after Mr. Trujillo's 
arrest." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, Trujillo does not stand for the proposition 
that the terms of a parole agreement are enforceable until probation is ultimately 
revoked. And it is worth noting further that the Tenth Circuit determined a search 
pursuant to a Fourth amendment waiver a few minutes after an arrest and one occurring 
months later was a material distinction because it declined to answer the latter question 
under the facts of Trujillo. 15 
In sum, Mr. Ellis' parole agreement was suspended when Mr. Ellis was arrested 
and taken into custody for his parole violation. At the moment his arrest warrant was 
issued, Mr. Ellis' legal status changed from a parolee to a fugitive from justice. 
l.C. § 20-228. However, he was still under the supervision of the department, and it 
was not until he was arrested and taken into custody that his parole agreement was no 
longer in affect. Fuller 138 Idaho at 63; LC. § 20-219. Moreover, the district court's 
decision to disregard the applicable Idaho authority and rely on inapposite federal 
authority, which deals with a different statutory scheme, was misplaced. Therefore, the 
district court erred when it determined that Mr. Ellis' parole agreement, and the Fourth 
Amendment waiver contained therein, was applicable at the time Officer Kiehl searched 
his apartment. 
15 The district court also relied on Latta v. Fitzhanis, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975). 
(R., pp.199-200.) However, that case is inapposite for the same reasons as the Trujillo 
opinion. 
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4. The State Failed To Establish Sufficient Facts To Support The Conclusion 
That Mr. Guerricabeitia Had The Authority To Consent To The Search Of 
Mr. Ellis' Apartment 
"Voluntary consent to search from a person who has actual authority to so 
consent obviates the need for a warrant." State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857, 862 (Ct. App. 
2001) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974)); Johnson, 110 Idaho 
at 522; State v. Ham, 113 Idaho 405, 406 (Ct. App. 1987). "Permission to search may 
come from someone other than the defendant who possessed common authority over 
or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." Lint v. 
State, 145 Idaho 472 (Ct. App. 2008). The state bears the burden of proving that 
consent has been given and that the person giving consent had authority to do so. 
Johnson, 110 Idaho at 521; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171. In the specific context of a 
landlord's ability to consent to the search of a lessee's residence, the ability to consent 
does not turn on the existence of the landlord's property interest in the area at issue. 
Johnson, 110 Idaho at 521 n.7. Instead, a landlord's ability to consent to a search of 
her/his tenant's residence turns on the existence evidence which indicates that the 
landlord enjoyed mutual use of the area searched. State v. Benson, 133 Idaho 152, 
156 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Absent the state's ability to demonstrate that the landlord had 
mutual use of the property such that the tenant assumed the risk his landlord might 
permit the apartment to be searched, the landlord lacked authority to consent to a 
search of his tenant's residence."). 
In this case, the district court found that Mr. Guerricabeitia had the authority to 
consent to the search of the storage area because Mr. Guerricabeitia, due to his status 
as Mr. Ellis' landlord, possessed common authority over the area .... " Mr. Ellis does 
not contest that Mr. Guerricabeitia had the authority to access the storage area from the 
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exterior entrance. However, Mr. Ellis argues that Mr. Guerricabeitia had no ability to 
consent to the search of his apartment because there are no facts in the record which 
support the conclusion that Mr. Guerricabeitia had either the mutual use of Mr. Ellis' 
apartment or any other basis for the authority to enter Mr. Ellis' apartment. The only 
facts in the record indicate that Officer Kiehl told Mr. Guerricabeitia that he was at 
Mr. Ellis' apartment to "perform a Fourth Amendment search." (R., p.67.) The only 
reasonable inference which can be drawn from those facts is that Mr. Guerricabeitia 
opened Mr. Ellis' apartment based on Officer Keihls' representation that he had 
authorization to search Mr. Ellis' apartment. 
Since the State failed to meet its burden of submitting facts which indicate that 
Mr. Guerricabeitia had mutual use of Mr. Ellis' apartment or any other basis of authority 
to consent to the search of Mr. Ellis' apartment, the third party consent exception is not 
applicable in this matter. 
5. The Exigency Exception To The Warrant Requirement Was Not 
Applicable To Officer Kiehl's Search Of Mr. Ellis' Apartment 
"[l]f officers have probable cause to search the residence and exigent 
circumstances are present, a warrantless entry, for limited purposes, is permisslble." 
State v. Yeates, 112 Idaho 377, 380-81 (Ct. App. 1987). "[E]xigent circumstances can 
justify a warrantless entry where there is probable cause and the officers have a 
reasonable belief that evidence will [imminently] be destroyed unless they act." Id. at 
381. "[By] 'reason to believe' we mean just that: reason to believe. Mere guesswork or 
whim will not do." Id. (quoting United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983)) 
(original emphasis). 'The state has the burden to show the existence of the exigent 
circumstances justifying a warrantless entry." Id. 
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In the context of a warrantless search of a residence, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that various factors had to be shown in order for the state to rely on the exigency 
exception. Id. The first factor is specific information that contraband was located in the 
residence. Id. The second factor is knowledge that people are located in the residence. 
Id. The third is the officer's ability to state facts known to her/him at the time of the 
warrantless action which create a reasonable belief that the contraband would be 
destroyed unless immediate action is taken. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals also held 
that "[t]he exigent circumstances exception does not apply where there is time to secure 
a warrant." State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 501 (Ct. App. 2007). 
In this case, the district court found the existence of an exigency which justified 
Officer Kiehl's entrance into Mr. Ellis' apartment. (R., pp.195-196.) This conclusion was 
based on the fact that Mr. Ellis had contacted his neighbor and asked her to remove 
contraband from his apartment. (R., pp.195-196.) Contrary to this conclusion, the 
record does not reflect the existence of three out of the four necessary factors required 
to justify reliance of the exigency exception to the warrant requirement. Mr. Ellis does 
not contest that Officer Kiehl had specific information that contraband was located in the 
residence. However, the record contains no evidence indicating that Officer Kiehl had 
reason to believe that someone was in Mr. Ellis' apartment at the time of the search. 
Numerous facts support this contention. First, Mr. Ellis was in custody at the time of this 
search, so he was not in the apartment. (R., pp.58, 193, 200.) Mr. Ellis contacted his 
neighbor, not a roommate, to dispose of the contraband. (R., pp.67, 193.) Had 
someone been in the apartment, Officer Kiehl could have knocked on the door and 
requested entry. However, Officer Kiehl contacted the landlord, Mr. Guerricabeitia, and 
he provided Officer Kiehl with access to Mr. Ellis' apartment after they opened the 
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storage area from the porch. (R., p.67.) Officer Kiehl also noticed the Mr. Ellis had mail 
in his mailbox before they entered his apartment, which suggests that no one was 
checking Mr. Ellis' mail. (R., p.68.) Most importantly, Officer Kiehl never said or 
otherwise indicated that he thought that someone was in Mr. Ellis' residence. (See 
generally R., pp.67-69.) 
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record indicating that Officer Kiehl 
thought that the contraband would be destroyed unless immediate action was taken. 
Officer Kiehl spoke with Mr. Ellis' neighbor on Monday March 29 at 4 p.m. about the 
contraband in Mr. Ellis' apartment. (R., p.67.) Officer Kiehl then waited until noon the 
following day to enter Mr. Ellis' apartment. (R., p.67.) If Officer Kiehl had a reasonable 
belief that the contraband was going to be immediately destroyed, he would have 
immediately gone over to Mr. Ellis' apartment after his 4 p.m. conversation with Mr. Ellis' 
neighbor. Absent that fact, the record does not support the conclusion that the 
contraband was subject to the risk if immediate disposal. 
Furthermore, nothing occurred on March 30, 2010, which would have given rise 
to an exigency. It was 12:10 p.m. when Officer Kiehl and Mr. Guerricabeitia opened the 
storage area. (R., p.67.) For some reason not clear in the record, they locked the 
storage area and went back to their cars. (R., p.67.) Almost a half hour later, at 
approximately 12:35 p.m., they decided to enter Mr. Ellis' apartment. (R., p.68.) Since 
the storage area was on the front porch of Mr. Ellis' apartment, their presence would 
have probably been noticed by someone in the home, which could have created an 
exigency to enter. 16 However, Officer Kiehl waited almost a half hour before he entered 
16 If this theory was argued as an alternate reason for the existence of an exigency it 
would be contrary to the rule which prevents the State from creating the exigency. (See 
State v. Kelly, 131 Idaho 774, 776-777 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a police officer 
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the apartment. This again, supports the conclusion that Officer Kiehl did not have any 
reason to believe that the contraband was going to be immediately destroyed. 
Despite these foregoing facts, the district court concluded that an exigency 
existed because l\!lr. Ellis' had called his neighbor to remove the evidence, which 
provided Officer Kiehl reason to believe "that haste was essential." (R., pp.195-196.) 
As argued above, this conclusion is not tenable because Officer Kiehl spoke with the 
neighbor, then waited until the next day to enter Mr. Ellis' apartment. (R., p.67.) 
Furthermore, there are no facts in the record indicating that Mr. Ellis had told a person, 
other than the neighbor, to enter his apartment and retrieve the contraband. The record 
does reflect that the only person Mr. Ellis told about the contraband went to Mr. Ellis' 
parole officer instead adhering to Mr. Ellis' instructions. Since there are no facts 
indicating that Mr. Ellis asked someone other than the neighbor to retrieve the 
contraband, the district court's legal conclusion is in error because it relied on mere 
guesswork to find an exigency. 
Turning to the final factor, there is no evidence in the record indicating that 
Officer Kiehl was not able to obtain a warrant. As stated above, Officer Kiehl found out 
about the possible existence of the contraband at 4:00 p.m. on Monday March 29, 2010, 
which is not a major holiday. (R., p.67.) Thus, Officer Kiehl could have obtained a 
search warrant that Monday evening. However, Officer Kiehl waited until noon on 
Tuesday March 30, 2010, to meet with l\!lr. Guerricabeitia to investigate the storage 
area. (R., p.67.) Again, Officer Kiehl had hours that morning to obtain a search 
warrant. After opening the storage area from the exterior entrance on the porch, Officer 
cannot create an exigency by knocking on a door where retreat was possible and 
knocking on the door alerted the residence's occupants of the officer's presence.) 
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Kiehl waited almost a half hour to enter Mr. Ellis apartment. (R., pp.67-68.) Officer 
Kiehl could have obtained a search warrant during that wait since a Boise City Police 
Officer arrived before they entered the apartment. (R., p.68.) Mr. Ellis' apartment is 
located at 312 North 15th Street, Boise Idaho, which is only a short drive to the Ada 
County Court House. (R., p.67.) While there are no facts in the record which evince an 
inability for Officer Kiehl to obtain a warrant, there are numerous facts which indicate 
that he had ample time to obtain one. 
In sum, the record is replete with facts that support the conclusion that no one 
was in Mr. Ellis' apartment at the time of the search, no exigency existed, and Officer 
Kiehl had over half of a non-holiday weekday to obtain a search warrant. Moreover, the 
record reflects that only one person was contacted by Mr. Ellis to remove the 
contraband, and that person went to the police instead of attempting to either remove or 
destroy the contraband. Thus, the district court erred when it concluded that an 
exigency existed to enter Mr. Ellis' apartment because that conclusion is not supported 
by the record and, therefore, was based on the district court's own guesswork. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ellis respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 5th day of October, 2012. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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